                       ˿µϣ20041117գ

04.11.17, ӡάزǶơ
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2004.11.14.

Ƽ2004.11.17.

(XYS20041117)

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йƼҪĸת䣺Ӵͳεʤ
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ƣӰ쳤Զʷʱʧź


----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
1ѧڡ񾭿ѧойѧԺϺѧ
ĹͬΡ
2оԺʵΣйƼѧʡ 
3йѧԺԺʿооԱ

20041118շڡȻй֮IIؼ

Rao, Y., Lu, B., & C.-L. Tsou: Nature 432 (Suppl), A12-A17, 
November 18, 2004.

______________________________________________________________________
___
BOX 
гڹ滮

2003꿪ʼĹгڹ滮쵼С¼ұΪ鳤ίԱ
ͼίԡƼЭгڹ滮֯һɿƼ
ɵĹίԱᡣ 

ȥһƼ֯20滮С飬ᡣЩųư
ǧƵĿѧҡʦҽȡ۵޸ֿƼ棬ӻ
ͷɻ·С

гڹ滮֮һɸ滮Сһϵشп⡣
ĿСЩ⣬쵼С齨Ȼûй
20滮С齫Լ50⣬ѡ1020
ǿȽʮҡ 

Щǿκһֹʱ׼Ǹߵġйһ
ԳĿǰȻѧȾѵܶȻѧ
198618ܾѡĴѧƻ
 ȻҲǴ⣬ֻоԺȾѵһС
֡

ǿʹ֮Ϊгڹ滮ĺģʹȻʧɫ
Ƹĸгڹ滮ĴйƼѧҡ
ʦĿ֮ΪرԼҵһг˳Ὣй
Ƽη?ЧΣ

A Fundamental Transition from Rule-by-Man to Rule-by-Merit
- What Will Be the Legacy of the Mid-to-Long Term Plan of Science and 
Technology?

Yi Rao1, Bai Lu2 and Chen-Lu Tsou3

In the first cabinet meeting after the inauguration of the new Chinese 
administration on March 22, 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao decided to 
initiate a national plan on science and technology (S&T) for the next 
15 to 20 years, known as the National Mid-to-Long Term Plan for S&T 
(MLP, see the Box). It indicates the governments confidence in the 
state of economy and reinforces the view that S&T is critical to 
further development of China.  
While the MLP will provide a major impetus (with substantial new 
funding) for S&T in China, we believe that the most fundamental 
problem in the Chinese S&T system has not been properly deliberated so 
far in the MLP. The current emphasis of the MLP is dominated by the 
creation and selection of megaprojects, projects with funding in 
the order of hundred of millions to billions of US dollars. We believe 
that the fundamental problem in Chinese S&T is that it is still in the 
stage of Rule-by-Man, in which politics (both social and academic) 
plays either an important or a dominant role at multiple levels. A 
more desirable system is Rule-by-Merit C in which merits 
determined by professionals with expertise in specific fields is the 
dominant factor in distributing funds in S&T, and political decisions 
are made only at the global level where societal and national needs 
are concerned, whereas regular administrators should be excluded from 
making or influencing S&T decisions. The National Natural Science 
Foundation of China (NNSFC) has shown through its 18 years of 
existence that it is feasible to establish mechanisms that can 
minimize problems in China. By comparing the NNSFC with the Ministry 
of Science and Technology (MOST), it is not difficult to conclude that 
the reassignment of the Chinese science budget from the MOST to the 
NNSFC is an immediate way to significantly improve the funding 
mechanism. Our conclusions and suggestions discussed below are based 
on our experiences in participating in scientific research and reviews 
in Chinese institutions, and comparative analysis of the strength and 
weakness of the Chinese system with those of other countries.
It will be unfortunate if the MLP simply means that China will rush to 
increase S&T funding without solving the fundamental problem. There 
are problems with formulation, selection, management and evaluation of 
MLP megaprojects, which can often be attributed to the fundamental 
problem. Due to the sheer size of the potential funding associated 
with MLP funded projects, both positive and negative impacts of the 
MLP will be significant and long-lasting. Here we provide some 
cautious notes, with an aim to stimulate further constructive 
discussions that may help to improve the chance for the success of the 
MLP and similar endeavors. Some of our suggestions may diminish the 
power of administrators and their entrenched interests. It is the 
sincere hope of the authors, one of whom has returned to work in China 
for more than 50 years after graduating from Cambridge in 1951 and the 
other two have contributed part-time efforts in the last 10 years, 
that this article can be useful to S&T in China.  

Achieving Rule-by-Merit: Separation of Political and Professional 
Decisions
A major mechanism for a government to influence S&T is through its 
distribution of public funds. The present funding mechanism in China 
S&T remains essentially a system of Rule-by-Man, partly due to the 
tradition in Chinese society, partly due to the transplantation of the 
Soviet style 50 years ago. There are at least 3 areas where the 
relationship between politics and S&T is confused.
First, at the national level, political leaders are sometimes placed 
in the position of selecting S&T projects. It is awkward that, even 
when specialized professional knowledge is required, national and, 
more often, cabinet-level, leaders can be directly involved in the 
selection of S&T projects. Political or non-professional 
considerations can over-step the borders when micromanagement is 
instituted.
Second, S&T professionals are placed on panels that are more 
convenient for academic politics than for professional reviews and 
evaluations. Professionals will then be involved in academic politics 
when they can not rely on professional judgment. In China, projects 
with large budgets are controlled by ministries such as the MOST or 
the State Commission on Development (SCD). They cover areas that range 
from nanotechnology to cancer research. These ministries often make 
professional experts judge projects beyond the scope of their expertise. 
A typical example is that a chemist can sit on a panel of 
approximately 20 experts who select projects from a pile of 
proposals including plasma physics and plant development. Because not 
a single expert on the panel can evaluate the relative merits of the 
competing proposals, the judgment of the experts can hardly be 
based on professional merits. As a result, academic politics often 
replace professional criteria during the selection of large projects 
organized by the ministries. Personal relationships and political 
alliances among professionals or between professionals and their 
political or administrative patronage lead to arbitrariness unrelated 
to the intrinsic S&T values.
	Third, middle- and low- level administrators in the ministries 
are allowed too much power and influence in S&T decisions. For example, 
bureau chiefs, unit chiefs, and even regular administrators of MOST 
have considerable influence in establishing programs, selecting review 
panelists, influencing panel discussions, and personal solicitation of 
proposals. It is a general perception in China that personal 
relationship with MOST officials is in securing large amounts of 
funding.
	Taken together, these result in close entanglement of politics 
(being it societal or academic) with S&T funding decisions. Major 
concerns with the mechanism for distributing S&T funds makes it 
difficult to motivate S&T professionals to put their major efforts on 
research or invention when distraction by non-professional interests 
or activities seems to be very helpful for their funding situations. 
It hampers the new Chinese government in its efforts to recruit highly 
trained and dedicated professionals when prospective applicants do not 
have sufficient confidence in the present system for its support of 
their professional development. If the Rule-by-Man system is not 
changed, it is also difficult to imagine how waste and corruption are 
can be avoided. 
To achieve the transition from Rule-by-Man to Rule-by-Merit, it is 
essential to delineate the border between politics and S&T, so that 
political decisions are separate from professional decisions. The 
separation of politics and S&T can begin with defining the roles of 
the political leadership, the professionals and the administrators. 
There are three principles that are important to reform the S&T system 
that will improve the efficiency of the Chinese S&T. Although 
instituting these principles requires changes in S&T management, they 
are presently feasible since they are compatible with the current 
political structure of China. First, political leaders can decide on 
the overall funding levels based on societal needs and consultations 
with professional leaders. Political leaders, together with S&T 
leaders and professional advice, can divide the pie of S&T funding to 
major sectors. Political leaders can be involved in specific projects 
only in special situations such as national defense needs or 
emergencies. Secondly, professionals should play major roles in the 
decision for funding projects. They should serve on review panels that 
present them with competing proposals whose relative merits they can 
understand, evaluate and deliberate. Thirdly, bureaucrats in various 
agencies should not be allowed to control or influence funding 
decisions, but rather be required to play the appropriate roles of 
support and service. 

Changing the MOST to an Office of S&T
Operationally, the function of MOST should be seriously re-considered. 
The present MOST is not efficient in advancing S&T in China, with its 
mechanisms of operation molded by the old Soviet style planned economy 
which has been outdated in China. MOST has two general roles: one in 
formulating S&T policy and plans, and the other in organizing S&T 
programs or projects and distributing funds. We believe that the first 
role can be more effectively played by a prospective Premiers Office 
of S&T, whereas the second role can be relegated to specialize agencies. 
It will increase efficiency and decrease the cost of government 
management.
In countries with more developed S&T, no ministry with powers as 
sweeping as the Chinese MOST exists to control S&T. Most countries, 
such as the US, Britain and Japan, do not have a ministry on S&T. In 
the few countries in which there is a ministry with similar title 
(such as the Ministry of Research and Education in Germany), they do 
not control the major budget for S&T and their administrators do not 
play such dominant roles as those enjoyed by the administrators in the 
Chinese MOST. With the total number of S&T professionals in China less 
than that in the US, and the overall budget of Chinese S&T well below 
that in the US, it is difficult to explain the existence of an extra 
and large ministry with more administrative cost to manage S&T in China. 
There is also no evidence that Chinese administrators are better 
trained or more qualified than US administrators to instruct (as 
the word often used in China in this context) S&T professionals in 
China. Is it then because China lacks other effective agencies for 
managing S&T budgets so that it has to rely on MOST? This also turns 
out to be untrue, at least for the science part of S&T, because the 
NNSFC has a much better reputation and is more efficient in 
distributing funds for science. NNSFC has adopted the principles of 
the US NSF and has proven to the Chinese scientists to be more reliable, 
more effective and more professional than MOST.
	The birth of MOST was a product of old Soviet style of planned 
economy. In fact, it was a Soviet advisor who suggested the Chinese 
government to initiate national plans on S&T, for which two temporary 
committees were formed in the 1950s: one on science planning and the 
other on technology planning. It was controversial when they were 
merged into a cabinet-level Commission after the completion of the 
1956 plan. Even those who argued for the establishment of a regular 
standing ministry (such as the then Vice Premier Chen Yi) only 
supported it to play roles in S&T planning, without a powerful role of 
distributing funds. The S&T Commission did not manage funds. It was 
small in the 1960s and disappeared for a while. However, it has 
evolved into a ministry controlling a large amount of S&T funds now.  
	The scope covered by each bureau of MOST is very broad. The 
resulting amalgamation of programs and projects in each bureau or its 
divisions causes the reviews to be nominal and makes it easy for 
administrators to control professionals in social and academic politics. 
Each bureau of MOST defines itself to organize and lead 
certain (large) aspect of S&T, which is accompanied by condescension 
towards professionals. Many S&T professionals including elitists in 
China have a hard time expressing their honest opinions in front of 
MOST officials and administrators. Every once in a while MOST 
administrators initiate new programs, reflecting their whims more than 
the true needs and development of S&T. Consequently, Chinese S&T 
professionals often dance to the tunes set by the administrators. As 
long as the MOST controls a large amount of S&T budget, the rule of 
Chinese S&T professionals by mediocre administrators is hardly 
avoidable. It is not difficult to imagine how the administrators treat 
professionals inside China if one learns that overseas Chinese 
professionals have been suggested to bribe the administrators or that 
some administrators have asked overseas professionals for bribes. The 
excessive empowerment in administrators is a major cause for these.
	We suggest: 1) that the science budget currently in MOST be 
reassigned to other agencies such as the more reputable funding agency 
NNSFC, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the Ministry of 
Education (MOE) whose institutes or universities conduct scientific 
research, and 2) that the technology budget of MOST be reassigned to 
specialized ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), or 
the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) and the Ministry of Information 
Industries. These agencies can more effectively manage the funds and 
run the projects with their lower level institutes.
 	At the present, NNSFC, which has a more rigorous reviewing 
mechanism, supports projects with moderate funds, whereas the 
ministries provide generous funds with little reviewing. It will be 
reasonable for the NNSFC to take over the role of funding science from 
the MOST. It is not that the NNSFC has no room for improvement, but 
that it has instituted better mechanisms for competition, professional 
reviewing and conflict-of-interest rules, which have proven to work in 
China. It is safe to state that anyone who has carefully witnessed 
their operations will reach an objective conclusion: that the current 
NNSFC can manage funding for science more rigorously, more efficiently, 
and less costly than the MOST. This demonstrates that an existing 
mechanism can immediately replace the function of the MOST in managing 
the science budget. We note that there are aspects in the NNSFC that 
do require further improvement, but it is relatively easy to reassign 
science budget to the NNSFC now. The reassignment will have immediate 
impact on institutions conducting research throughout China. They will 
have to devote more time and efforts on professional excellence, and 
refrain from cultivating relationships with MOST officials or other 
administrators, because, although influences by administrators in the 
NNSFC are not completely absent, they are significantly less than 
those in the MOST; professional merits are more important in NNSFC 
reviews.
	The prospective Premiers Office of S&T, after giving up the 
control of funding, can play roles that are needed in China. Although 
the power of this office will appear smaller than the MOST in the 
perspective of administrative control of funds, it can play roles that 
are not played by other agencies. It can provide advice on S&T to the 
Premier without self-promotion for more funds under its own control, 
and formulate policies and regulations based on national interests for 
the development of S&T. If necessary, it can also establish mechanisms 
to monitor the appropriateness and the efficiency of fund distribution 
by other agencies. For special cases or under special circumstances, 
it can also obtain the permission of the Premier to coordinate 
programs or projects that require the participation of institutions 
from multiple ministries. 
	Advisory committees and counseling groups with real power 
should be established at various levels in S&T-related government 
agencies. These groups, consisting of experts in S&T, can provide 
advice and recommendations on S&T policies, appropriation and fund 
distribution, new initiatives, and strategic considerations. 
Rigorous merit-based review mechanisms should be established in all 
S&T-related government agencies for resource allocation. The mechanism 
used by the NNSFC could serve as a model. 

Concerns with MLP Megaprojects 
Controversies have arisen about megaprojects in the MLP. It is natural 
that the size of projects can differ as science and technology develop. 
The major concerns are therefore not with the question whether there 
should be large projects, but with the underlying reason for 
soliciting large projects, the frequency that the government should 
solicit large projects, and the selection and the performance 
evaluation of large projects. Before significant improvement of the 
funding mechanism in China, it is unlikely that the direction and 
efficiency of large projects will provide maximal positive stimulation 
to Chinese S&T.
	There are large projects in more developed countries, but the 
origin of those projects is different from that in China. For example, 
the Human Genome Project in the US was proposed by scientists who 
believed that it was time to sequence the human genome, and debated 
among scientists before it was funded by the government. It is not that, 
if a government has more funds, then scientists can immediately come 
up with big projects. In addition to megaprojects in the MLP, Chinese 
ministries also often come up with programs to fund large projects, 
again in the mode of funds leading projects, not projects leading funds.
In the process formulating and selecting megaprojects in the MLP, 
problems with MOST projects are often repeated and amplified. 
Proposals for projects often have no or little competition. The small 
number of proposals to be selected (less than 20) and the size of each 
project have dictated the way proposals are formulated. A project must 
be broad in scope, inclusive in its participants, and appealing to the 
political leadership or administrators in social implications. 
Without specialized assessment of professional merits, there is little 
depth to argue about simplified social implications. In order to 
balance the interests of various areas, it appears that the 
formulation of the proposal involves grouping many different research 
areas under one large banner, an exercise of window dressing and 
packaging, rather than scientific creativity or technological 
innovation. Such exercises have been practiced in the past for 
previous large projects, e.g., 863 and 973 programs, although the size 
of funding is now larger by up to two orders of magnitude. This 
practice becomes an obstacle for a truly competitive merit-based 
funding system.
One concern is how megaprojects are evaluated after they are funded. 
If these projects are managed and supervised by the same agency (the 
MOST again) that is largely responsible for the selection and funding 
of the projects, problems and failures associated with the projects 
are unlikely to be admitted because it will directly affect the 
credibility of the agency and the promotion of its administrators. 
Furthermore, the total pool of professionals with a sufficient level 
of expertise in any given area is relatively small in the present day 
China. One megaproject can include most, if not all, active 
researchers in that area, thereby leaving few or no experts who can 
provide objective and critical evaluation. Chinese researchers 
understand this well and, once their proposals are funded, will have 
little pressure to achieve the proclaimed goals.  
Given the high risk associated with funding megaprojects, an 
alternative is to reduce their funding, or divert a substantial amount 
of funds to existing agencies such as the NNSFC, which can then 
solicit proposals for large, medium and small projects in various 
fields, and review them on a competitive basis. The size of the 
projects must depend on research needs to eliminate the possibility 
for professionals to scale the size of projects in proportion to the 
governments predetermined funding capability. 

The Legacy of MLP: an Important Choice

The success or failure of the MLP and its associated megaprojects may 
well become a major legacy of the current administration. Will it be 
remembered as a major contribution for furthering the development of 
S&T in China? Or a missed opportunity? It involves an important choice.

The late Premier Zhou Enlai and his generation of leaders, who led the 
1956 S&T plan, has often been credited for their determination and 
success in supporting the nuclear and space programs in China. 
Although less striking to the general public, it should be remembered 
that major achievements of the 1956 plan also include the overall 
increase of S&T funding, and the establishment of research institutes 
and universities. It can be argued that the legacy of Zhou and 
colleagues lies more in their establishment of the foundation and 
infrastructure of S&T in China.
If the nuclear and space programs serve as monuments to Zhous 
generation, it is partly because there were well-defined S&T projects 
urgently needed by China at the time. At the present, as in most peace 
time, there are few well-defined goals that can be solved by a few 
simple megaprojects.  
For the national leadership, a project bigger in impact and 
significance than all the MLP megaprojects is to establish mechanisms 
in S&T that will allow professionals in China to achieve their full 
professional potentials and to focus their time and efforts on their 
professional activities. Future history will perhaps show that the 
legacy of MLP lies not in specific megaprojects that it supports, but 
in its long-term impacts on the Chinese S&T infrastructure for 
sustained development of China. The Chinese S&T institutions and 
management systems have lagged far behind the economic sector, where 
the planned economy has been essentially replaced with a competitive 
and market-driven economy. The S&T system in China needs to readjust 
to catch up with economic development in China. 

----------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------
1Professor of Neurology and the Deputy Director of the Institute of 
Neuroscience at Northwestern University in Chicago, Illinois, USA, and 
the Co-director of the Shanghai Institute for Advanced Studies (SIAS) 
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS);
2Chief of the Section on Neural Development and Plasticity at NICHD of 
the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland, USA, and a 
Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Science and Technology of China;
3Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and an Investigator in 
the CAS Institute of Biophysics in Beijing, China 

_______________________________________________________________

BOX 

National Mid-to-Long Term Plan for S&T 

The leading group of National Mid-to-Long Term Plan for S&T 
(abbreviated as MLP hereafter) includes Premier Wen Jiabao and a small 
number of ministers. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is 
in charge of managing MLP and for organizing an advisory committee 
consisting of leaders in S&T.  

Over the past year, MOST has organized a large number of meetings, 
panel discussions, and regular sessions of 20 planning subgroups. 
These activities purportedly have involved thousands of scientists, 
engineers, physicians, and managers, etc..  Multiple S&T topics have 
been discussed, ranging from environmental issues to manufacture of 
airplanes and rotation around the moon. 

A central component is a set of megaproject proposals by various 
subgroups that will compete for funding from the government in the 
coming years. The Group of Important Projects will review the 
proposals and makes recommendations to the Premier and his Leading 
Group, which will make the final decisions. Although details have not 
been made public, it is commonly assumed that 10 to 20 projects will 
be selected among approximately 50 proposals from the 20 subgroups, 
with each project funded in the range of 1 to 10 billion Chinese RMB 
(or 100 million to 1 billion USD).

The scale of these megaprojects is large by any international standard. 
One MLP project will be supported by a budget exceeding the entire 
annual budget of the National Natural Science Foundation of China 
(NNSFC), which is currently the major funding agency for 
investigator-initiated projects for all natural sciences. The funding 
level for some megaprojects may be larger than the total amount 
invested in the NNSFC for the past 18 years since its founding in 1986. 
By contrast, the Human Genome Project in the US, although a 
megaproject in its own right, never cost more than a moderate fraction 
of the total annual NIH budget.  

The sheer magnitude of funding for megaprojects outshines other 
aspects associated with MLP, which includes reforms of institutional 
and administrative structures and management mechanisms.  The MLP 
megaprojects have attracted the attention of Chinese research 
institutions and leading scientists and engineers, who view these 
projects as a gravy train that will carry their institutions and their 
own careers forward in the next two decades. But where will it lead 
Chinese S&T overall?

(XYS20041117)

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ȷ֤ʽЩԶʷзڵĸָݶÿˡ
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ԡһڣִʷУйص۹ԭͼֵ۴
ĸҪ˽۹ĲΪ尲ȫҪʹӱ
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Υѧо׼ˡΪȻαѧȷʵڣĨ
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ܵȻһЩ˵ϣԽԽãϧ
ƤƤĥȷ⵽״һʲô룬Ч

ԭ⾷εҩбгЧⶾء

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󣬵µĲɣµĺۼκλױƷ޷ֲġڸֳ
ջ֮£֮վռϷ硣

ҦŮʿչַһӪԺƽһ

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һϸСűǻֱˮƽ룬עһֶصҩǰ
Լ10ӣҽͶ׳Ƶλע䡣

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Ŀǰгǳŵһ弼

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ԺһۺۡӻƾͳҽѧоĿ⣬ֱ
20°Ҷ˷·

1986꣬ôһλŮҽڸ⾷֢ʱó
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Լⲻϵطźţʹⲻͣض鴤˴ʹࡣ

ѧҷһҩ񾭶Լ˶źŴ
Լáҩͽⶾأôҽעľ
ء

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軯غAⶾȣⶾصĶҪ軯صĶǿһ򱶡

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鼡ָáͺʮ·ڣղſ̵ƣ׼
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רҵ֪ʶͳþ顣

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հն˱Ϻ󣬾Ͳܸⷢʩˣ񾭷
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˽⣬ⶾһע䲻ܳ2000λעⶾصǰ
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ڷȿҩûպãǽλõƫ
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οƼͽλãҪרҵ֪ʶҪߵ䡢ι
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90ݿʼں硣

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ͨݣеҹԶĹֻŮʿ
ϲơӳ˵пѧúЧǳҲ
ڶǡ֮͡ǣһּеݼ
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ҦŮʿۡ´ұ鼡ⲻԳƵȲ֢

⣬ּЧãҲʼһЩⶾصļҩ
⣬ĿǰҹֻƷоⶾء

Ǿ綾ʣҩƷ۹ǳϸһֻй
ҽƻȨʹãһԺҩƷǲģĿ
ǰг淶£߻Ϊá

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ǷȻң
һŵ԰

Ϻ鱨2004.11.17

ߡο

ϣ
׼ϵͳ1967꣬ҪԿݡЧʶ鼮ĳء
硢汾װ硢̼ͼձʹôϵͳΪ
鼮̵֮á1976ϵͳ

ҵĹ

ãҽţ۽ѣҵƬ۵ң
йѪҺҵүүǴлעἯţϰǹ
硣ôĽɡ

ۼҡǴ2001ԳҵΪΣҵΧ
ͼ־ȫʢʱۼһҪϰءڳ
Ͳˡ˵ᣬʵڻܡߣǣ
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ƹ֮

ǣԵķϣһСܣǧ˵ȥŶ
ϰֲǽйʳԭһֱΪĸ磭ҵĴ󲮣
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ݵԺеȻ޴档ϣһӡۼҲ黧ڣͨ
ϰֳ棬ϰֵʱϴ裬ֻ˻ڱӡ
ҵһοۼһڱʣغ档һֻд
ţۡлעἯ޹˾۹˾ע³ģ
ֱĴǻع޹˾ۻǿۺҵţҵ
鼰أȫʸ۹˾ʳ硢ԭ̱ר
ߺλͨʻƷʲôҵĴﾹ
ȻûѧԺ磬⣬ôܣ⻹Ժô찡
վϵϰ֪º󣬴һǱɱУүүҲǴ
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ɻɣô˵עһҳעأʵɣ
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ͨ˾һ򵥣ֻ۵Ĺ˾עᴦ棬1720Ԫ۱
С½Ҫ

ҵĹ

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ͬһʻţһţ˵
ﵽ˹ˮ׼ISBNʻʽעݡ



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ϸֿо࣬ȫաй˼棬Ȼǵרҵʦ
ӡ30010ɡӡˢʽӡˢѡӡˢ
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磬ѯҪˡİˣ绰桢ʵ
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֪۵Ĺʱ׼ѵģڵҪ飬ֻҪ浥λ
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ۡΥϹ涨ģΪǷһּ鴦

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ְơ˵֪ж٣

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